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Employment has served as the primary institutional mechaism through
which the United States has met the population's basic social welfare needs,
and the employment relationship has been the principal determinant of social
welfare.1 Dr. Richard S. Belous notes that much of American social welfare
comes through the private sector in the form of health care coverage,
pension programs, and employer-sponsored retirement savings plans.2
The employment-based social welfare system grew out of postwar
collective bargaining addressed to the anomaly noted m 1949 by then United
Steelworkers President Philip Murray- "Every well-operated company sets
aside money for depreciation, repair, and replacement of machinery Only
infrequently, however, does it make similar provisions for the care of its
employees - human beings. "3 The alternative to recognizing employee
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A. 1968,
J.D. 1981, The University of Michigan.
1. See Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Work Force: The Key Chal-
lenges and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 863, 876 (1995); Eileen Appelbaum,
Structural Change and the Growth of Part-Tine and Temporary Employment, in NEW
POLICIES FOR THE PART-TiME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 1, 12 (Virginia L. duRivage
ed., 1992) [hereinafter NEW POLICIES]; Frangoise J. Carr6, Temporary Employment in the
Eighties, m NEW POLICIES, supra, at 45, 80; Mary E. O'Connell, On the Frnge: Rethinking
the Link Between Wages and Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REV 1421, 1425-40 (1993).
2. Belous, supra note 1, at 876.
3. Alan Denckson, Health Security For All? Social Unionism and Universal Health
Insurance, 1935-1958, 80 J. AM. HIST. 1333, 1349 (1994) (quoting PHILIP MURRAY, THE
STEELWORKERS' CASE FOR WAGES, PENSIONS, AND SOCIAL INSURANCE AS PRESENTED TO
PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S STEEL INDUSTRY BOARD 20 (1949)); see Edmund F Wehrle, "For a
Healthy America"- Labor's Struggle for National Health Insurance 1943-1949, 5 LAB.'s
HERITAGE 28, 42 (1993).
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welfare as a business cost was to provide for the general welfare through
social insurance to protect "against the common misfortunes of industrial
society," as West European nations had by then established.4 However,
unsuccessful in achieving either a significant liberalization of Social Security
or national health insurance, the labor movement pursued privatization.
Unionized workers "advanced toward the ideal of comprehensive benefits,
fully financed by their employers." 5 By the end of the 1950s, the spread of
benefits decelerated among rank-and-file workers, "coming to a complete
stop in the mid-1980s."6
The trend since has been for businesses to shift labor cost responsibil-
ities and risks to workers. Defined benefit pension plans have been replaced
by defined contribution savings plans yielding an uncertain retirement
income. Other fixed benefit entitlements, such as specified health coverage,
have given way to defined contribution spending accounts that allow benefit
cost increases to be allocated entirely to employees. Many employers have
altogether disavowed responsibility for maintenance of the welfare of their
work force.
Employment relations have become increasingly attenuated due to
expanded use of independent contractors and other contingent employment
arrangements. Recent years have seen fragmentation, polarization, and
atomization in the workplace. The portion of the work force covered by
collective bargaining agreements has declined, contributing "to growing
inequality "' Contingent workers are particularly disadvantaged, rarely
being extended "fringe benefits," a misnomer belying the centrality to
worker well-being of health insurance and retirement income security plans
that have formed the core of employment-provided benefits.
Professor Arne L. Kalleberg shows that much part-time work is
involuntary and mequitable.8 Other studies have reached similar conclusions
about temporary employment arrangements.9 Many "part-timers, temps and
free-lancers" may be secondary earners, but "a growing number depend on
4. Derickson, supra note 3, at 1335.
5. Id. At 1355; see O'Connell, supra note 1, at 1438; AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SECTION
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW lxx-lxxii & 4-5 (Steven J.
Sacher et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW].
6. Derickson, supra note 3, at 1355.
7 BENNEMr HARRISON, LEAN AND MEAN: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE
POWER IN THE AGE OF FLEXIBILITY 195 (1994).
8. See generally Arne L. Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and Workers in the United States:
Correlates and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 771 (1995).
9. See generally Carr6, supra note 1.
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these jobs to support families." 10  Moreover, even if some workers
voluntarily forego benefits from their own employment and depend on
benefits received through a spouse's employment, family coverage raises the
labor costs of the covered spouse's employer, increasing that employer's
economic incentive to shift work to involuntary contingent employees.
Thus, traditional work and family welfare delivery structures have made
women "the leading edge of the degradation of the work force. "II
Employers that provide health insurance to employees subsidize the
labor costs of those that do not - directly, by covering spouses and
dependents who work for those firms, and also indirectly, through higher
doctor and hospital bills that include the cost of providing uncompensated
care to the employees of firms that fail to provide medical coverage.
12
Businesses that provide coverage, subject to unfair competition from those
that do not, are under tremendous pressure to cut back labor costs in order
to remain competitive. Ultimately, the labor costs of employers who do not
provide benefits are being subsidized by the employees of those who do in
the form of reduced wages.
For this reason, the continued growth of contingent employment in its
present form threatens the econonuc security of the entire American work
force. Employment relations have "entered a new era in which the
responsibilities for health care insurance, an adequate wage, and indeed,
even job creation," have been shifted to individual employees and the
family, 3 the institution through which social benefits from the workplace
10. Sue Shellenbarger, Work & Family: Flexible Workers Come Under the Umbrella
of Family Programs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at B1.
11. Barbara P Noble, Women Seeking a Working Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995,
at F23 (quoting Heidi Hartmann, head of Institute for Women's Policy Research, speaking
at Center for Policy Alternatives' Women's Voices for the Economy Commission meeting).
12. In 1991, employers who sponsored health insurance for their employees indirectly
paid $10.8 billion for uncompensated care and directly paid $26.4 billion to cover spouses
(and other dependents) employed by nonmsurmg firms. See Press Statement of Senator Tom
Daschle, Co-Chair, United States Senate Democratic Policy Committee (Mar. 9, 1994).
UAW President Owen Bieber testified before Congress that 15 % of the health care costs of
the Big Three automakers are attributable to coverage of spouses who are employed but not
covered by their employer for health insurance: "In some cases companies are indirectly
paying for the health care costs of their competitors." The Impact on Negotiations, 28 UAW
AMMO (UAW, Detroit, Mich.), Jan. 1994, at 10-11.
13. Virginia L. duRivage, New Policies for the Part-Time and Contingent Work-
force, in NEW POLICIES, supra note 1, at 89, 90; see Belous, supra note 1, at [20] (report-
ing that "rise of contingent work forces m the United States has contributed significantly
to the relative decline in health care coverage and pension coverage for typical American
workers").
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have been broadly distributed. In short, employers increasingly have forced
workers who are in no position to protect their own economic security to
assume a portion of the employers' business costs without any corresponding
right to business profits. Employers increasingly treat employees, particu-
larly part-time and temporary workers, as if they were independent
entrepreneurs or outsource work to independent contracting firms that pay
lower wages and benefits. 4
Professor Kalleberg is among those who recognize that the "[1]aws and
institutions intended to provide worker protection were established mainly
for full-time, permanent employees. "15 These laws and institutions assume,
for example, that "most families will receive health insurance through a
steadily employed head, while Medicare and Medicaid take care of the
rest ",16 To address the needs of the increasing number of those for
whom continuous attachment to a single employer is no longer realistically
possible, "we need to rethink the U.S. system for provision of social
benefits." 17 The policy response to contingent employment should not
preclude workers from pursuing alternative work schedules but should
ensure that workers individually and as a whole do not lose key social
benefits as a result.
In the recent debate over national health reform, the choice seemed to
be between either replacing employment-provided benefits with government-
provided social insurance"8 or legislating employer responsibility to provide
for worker welfare. However, in the new U.S. political environment we do
not have much choice but to explore the possibilities of worker self-help.
We have been here before. The story of the labor movement's first
campaign for social insurance in the 1940s reflects "the difficult choices
faced by organized labor, forever operating in an antagonistic atmosphere. "19
Despite strong ties to the White House, "conservative opposition forced
14. Harrison, supra note 7, at 196. Those properly classified as independent
contractors are distinguished by their capacity to "suffer a loss or make a profit from the
services provided." Bill Seeks to Establish Standard for Defining Independent Contrac-
tors, 13 Employee Rel. Wkly (BNA) No. 7, at 176 (Feb. 20, 1995) (citing proposed legis-
lation).
15. Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 773.
16. Chris Tilly, Short Hours, Short Shrift: The Causes and Consequences of Part-Time
Employment, in NEW POLICIES, supra note 1, at 15, 39; see Belous, supra note 1, at 876.
17 Carre, supra note 1, at 80.
18. Many countries "that have high part-time employment levels have developed an
advanced social safety net" so that the "lack of employer-provided health benefits may not
be a real problem." Belous, supra note 1, at [17].
19. Wehrle, supra note 3, at 44.
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organized labor to rely on its tradition of voluntansm and self-reliance
through economic power as the most immediate and perhaps only avenue"
to secure economic security for workers."
By worker self-help I mean: (1) negotiating protections through
collective bargaining; -(2) tapping technical expertise to enforce expansive
interpretations of existing protective laws; and (3) lobbying for bipartisan,
worker-friendly tax legislation to respond to the "indiVidual responsibility"
being thrust on workers in this brave, new, every-man-for-humself world.
This paper offers some illustrative strategies to achieve improved health and
retirement income security for contingent workers m response to the
coercive and degraded employment environment that Professor Kalleberg
and others have described.
I. The Problem
According to Ellen Bravo, President of 9to5, National Association of
Working Women, an affiliate of the Service Employees International Umon
(SEIU), part-time and temporary job, options "should be voluntary and
equitable. [But] in many cases, they are neither."21 As Professor Kalleberg
notes, "If people voluntarily choose to work part time, then presumably they
are getting what they want and there are fewer problems in need of
legislative and regulatory remedies. "I That is not to say that there are not
important questions as to how public policy can facilitate, rather. than
obstruct, voluntary contingent employment arrangements. The federal
income tax "marriage penalty" and the structure of Social Security discour-
age married secondary earners from entering the work force as part-time or
temporary workers.' Joint income tax filing rates tax the second earner's
entire income at a high marginal rate, and a marred person filing a separate
return pays a higher tax than a single worker.24 Further, secondary earners
pay Social Security taxes that do not increase the benefits to which they are
already entitled, without entering the work force, as dependents.'
20. Id.
21. Shellenbarger, supra note 10, at B1.
22. Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 793.
23. See generally Richard C. Beck, Joint Return Liability and Poe v Seaborn Should
Both be Repealed, 49 TAX NOTES 457 (1990); Jonathan B. Forman, A Strategy for Middle-
Class Tax Relief to Help Families, 65 TAX NOTES 127 (1994); Deborah A. Geier, Restoration
of the Two-Earner Couple Deduction: Why?, 65 TAx NOTES 497 (1994); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Abolish the Joint Return!, 65 TAX NOTES 921 (1994).
24. I.R.C. § l(a), (d) (Supp. V 1993).
25. Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) provides benefits to
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However, the greater public policy challenges are posed by involuntary
contingent employment arrangements. As Professor Kalleberg observes,
"[P]eople who do not choose to work part time are presumably less able to
satisfy their needs and wants." 26 Professor Kalleberg's and other studies
show that contingent employment is in fact leaving basic economic security
needs unmet.
Five years ago, 4.5% of the total work force, representing 25% of
part-time workers, worked part time involuntarily, and involuntary part-
time work is expanding at twice the rate of voluntary part-tume work.' In
1992, close to one-third of those working part time were doing so
involuntarily 28 Professor Kalleberg notes that the numbers actually may
be higher than reported because the number of "voluntary" part-time
workers may include those who want, but are not able, to work full time,
for example due to lack of adequate child care or transportation.29
Professor Kalleberg's analysis contradicts the comfortable assumption
that part-time employment has mushroomed to satisfy a demand gener-
ated by women's participation in the work force and preference for
flexibility
Other studies indicate that women are taking temporary work because
of their "lack of bargaiing power and limited employment alternatives."30
Women accept temporary work because employers are creating more
protect elderly spouses and widows of covered workers. When an individual is entitled to
benefits both as a covered worker and as the spouse of a covered worker, Professor Jonathon
B. Forman explains that "the so-called 'dual entitlement rule' prevents her from receiving
both her full worker benefit and her full spousal benefit. Instead, only the larger of the two
benefits is paid. Consequently, at retirement, a woman can discover that her career-long
payments of OASI taxes get her absolutely no additional OASI benefits." Forman, supra note
23, at 127
26. Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 793.
27 Id. at 772.
28. See Jonathan P Hiatt & Lynn Rhinehart, The Growing Contingent Work Force: A
Challenge for the Future, 10 LAB. LAW 143, 145 (1994) (citing U.S. Department of Labor
statistics).
29. See Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 776; see also Sue Shellenbarger, Work & Family:
When Workers' Lives Are Contingent on Employers' Whims, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1995, at
B1 (reporting that "many contingent workers face daunting child-care and family problems,
without any of the usual safety nets such as paid sick or personal days"); duRivage, supra
note 13, at 111 (citing 1980 Presser and Baldwin finding that nearly 35% of women working
part time or looking for work reported they would work more hours if good child care were
available).
30. Appelbaum, supra note 1, at 4; see Belous, supra note 1, at 871 (reporting con-
scious corporate strategy to use contingent workers).
820
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temporary positions, not because contingent employment meets their
needs.31
Indeed, Professor Kalleberg's work shows that contingent employment
is spawning an underclass of working Americans by contributing to
polarization in income, benefits, and noneconomic job rewards.32 Others
agree that, for too many workers, "flexibility breeds social and economic
insecurity ,,31 Professor Kalleberg reports that part-time workers earn
roughly half the hourly cash wages of full-time workers.' A breakdown
by occupational category showed the same 50% differential in wages.35
Temporary workers earn 20 % less on average than permanent employees.36
Most part-time workers are not covered under employment-provided
health or retirement income plans, with involuntary part-time workers
being "nearly three times as likely not to have health insurance as voluntary
part-time workers."37 For Professor Kalleberg, the "pattern of disadvan-
tage for part-time workers with regard to fringe benefits is clear.
Persons working part time obtain fewer fringe benefits than those working
full- time, even after controlling for their education, age, race, length of
experience with their employer, occupational level, authority position,
whether they are self-employed, and the size of their employing establish-
ment."38 Although some contingent workers have health insurance under
the family coverage provided through the employment of a spouse or other
family member, studies show that close to half of part-time workers have
no direct or indirect employment-based health coverage.39 Temporary
workers are similarly disadvantaged.40 Among temporary employees, the
31. Appelbaum, supra note 1, at 4.
32. Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 793.
33. duRivage, supra note 13, at 89
34. Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 780.
35. Belous, supra note 1, at 874 tbl. 5; see Hiatt & Rhmehart, supra note 28, at 148
(reporting that studies show that part-time worker who is identical to full-time worker m
industry, occupation, sex, age, and other characteristics still earns average of 10-15% less
per hour).
36. See Hiatt & Rhmehart, supra note 28, at 148-49.
37 Id. at 149; see Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 782.
38. Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 782-83.
39. See Belous, supra note 1, at 875 tbl. 6 (reporting that 48-49.5% of part-time
workers have no coverage under employer plan); Tilly, supra note 16, at 22 (citing Employee
Benefits Research Institute report that approximately 42% of part-time workers have no direct
or indirect employment-based health coverage).
40. See Hiatt & Rhinehart, supra note 28, at 149.
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Employee Benefits Research Institute has estimated that 30% lack any
health insurance.41
Professor Kalleberg's analysis demonstrates that these differences are
not justified by differential work motivations of part-time and full-time
workers. His data show that full-time and part-time workers are about
equally committed to their employers42 and that part-time workers are just
as likely to designate work as a person's most important life activity 43 In
sum, contingent work arrangements have evolved not to accommodate a
less committed component of the work force but to unfairly disadvantage
many workers who have no other choice.'
IIL Strategies
In 1946, a time not unlike the present, following a calamitous election
and failed health reform effort, then United Auto Workers (UAW)
President Walter Reuther announced that "[i]n the immediate future,
security will be won for our people only to the extent that the union
succeeds in obtaining such security through collective bargaining." '45
Private contract is the regulatory vehicle of choice in the new employment
and political regime, and contract negotiations are a means of mandating
employer responsibility for worker welfare. The new egoistic brand of
individualism is, of course, the antithesis of union solidarity and mutuality
Nevertheless, the new realities and the old values may be partially
reconciled through collective bargaining by which "workers themselves can
flexibly negotiate changes in the terms of employment, rather than counting
on government policies that are often rigid and difficult to enforce."46
There is also, of course, the individualistic vehicle of private litigation
to enforce employment rights. Often, denying benefits to workers
classified as part-time, temporary, or independent contractors violates the
41. See Carr6, supra note 1, at 56.
42. Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 790.
43. Id. at 777
44. See Hiatt & Rhmehart, supra note 28, at 147-48.
45. Denckson, supra note 3, at 1344 (citing Walter Reuther, Announcement of UAW-
CIO Social Security Program (Nov 15, 1946), quoted in Frank G. Dickinson, The Trend
Toward Labor Health and Welfare Programs, 133 JAMA 1285, 1286 (1947)); see Gwen T.
Handelman, Health Care Reform and Workers: Which Stories Do You Believe?, in
AMERiCAN BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 1994 ANNUAL MEETING
PROGRAM PAPERs Tab 8 (May 31, 1994); Wehrle, supra note 3, at 36.
46. Tilly, supra note 16, at 40.
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requirements of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, as amended (ERISA),47 or the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended (Code).48 Individual lawsuits are a means of enforcement. As
one labor lawyer has observed, "Prosecuting or proposing to prosecute such
lawsuits should dissuade employers, at least m marginal situations 149
However, litigation is a costly one-by-one approach that falts to address
workplace unfairness systematically 10 To the extent that the success of
claims turns on individual facts-and circumstances, as is often the case,
class actions will be unavailing. Well-informed advocates of workers'
rights, willing and able to publicize violations and seek enforcement by the
Department of Labor or Internal Revenue Service (IRS), may avert the
need to vindicate rights through litigation.
Legislative lobbying efforts also may make the difference between
success and failure of closely contested legislative proposals that would
affect workers for good or ill, such as worker classification reform and
taxes on employment-provided health benefits.
A. Organizing and Collective Bargaining
Unions such as the SER, UAW, Communications Workers of
America (CWA), and United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) are
seeking improved status for contingent workers.5' The goal is to expand
"hard-won social benefits and employment rights - which are currently
tied to traditional forms of employment - to cover workers in new
employment arrangements."52 Equalization efforts may take diverse forms
to fit the particular employment environment, perhaps including offering
workers a menu of diverse benefits from which to choose.53 However,
employers often have used flexible benefit arrangements to bail out of their
47 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
48. Title 26 of the U.S.C.
49. Marsha S. Berzon, Employer Evasion of Collective Bargaining and Employee Pro-
tective Statutes Through Independent Contractor Status, 13 LAB. L. EXCHANGE 1, 2 (1994).
50. See generally Michael F Marmo, Is There Justice for EMPLOYERS? Employment
Litigation and Its Increasing Burden on the Judicial System - It's Time for ADR! (Aug. 8,
1993) (presented at session on "Advancing Justice: Is There Justice for ALL?", ABA Annual
Meeting, New York, N.Y.) (on file with author).
51. Shellenbarger, supra note 10, atBi.
52. Carr6, supra note 1, at 81.
53. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 125 (Supp. V 1993) (governing tax treatment of flexible benefit
arrangements).
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health benefit responsibilities, capping their obligation at a set dollar amount
and leaving employees to contend with health cost inflation on their own.
Benefits arrangements for contingent workers "will have to ensure that the
costs of these benefits [will] not be borne solely by individual workers. "I
The UAW has included part-time workers in agreements, and unions
representing service workers have successfully negotiated hourly wage
parity, seniority rights, and prorated and full benefits for contingent
workers.5' Those organizing and bargaining for contingent workers,
however, face legal and practical obstacles.
1. Legal Considerations
Employee representatives should be aware of potential legal issues and
plan accordingly Including contingent workers in a collective bargaining
unit allows unions to extend group health insurance and retirement plan
participation and to negotiate the right of temporary workers to move to
permanent status.56 However, collective bargaining on behalf of contingent
workers is difficult to achieve under current labor law The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) determines "appropriate bargaining umts" and has
been "inconsistent in its rulings as to whether part-time and contingent
workers should vote along with full-time employees in representational
elections. "'
The NLRB has included short-term hires in the bargaining unit by
using, on a case-by-case basis, the criterion of "commumty of interests"
between the permanent and temporary work forces.58 A union may include
temporary employees who establish a sufficient connection with the pre-
existing work force and, depending on state law, may negotiate to require
that workers supplied by temporary help and staffing firms belong to the
union. 9 The NLRB has been willing to find both the temporary agency and
the client-employer jointly responsible for violations of temporary workers'
rights under the'National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 60
54. Carre, supra note 1, at 81.
55. duRivage, supra note 13, at 117
56. Carre, supra note 1, at 79.
57 duRivage, supra note 13, at 117
58. Carr6, supra note 1, at 79
59. See, e.g., Edward A. Lenz, Co-Employment - A Review of Customer Liability
Issues in the Staffing Services Industry, 10 LAB. LAW 195, 206-08 (1994).
60. Id. at 206 (citmg NLRB v Western Temporary Servs., Inc., 821 F.2d 1258 (7th
Cir. 1987)).
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Nevertheless, "leased employees," who may have an even greater
interest in joining a union because they work on an ongoing basis for the
client employer, may be effectively denied the right to union representation.
"As presently interpreted, the [NLRA] places little responsibility on clients
that effectively dictate the economic conditions of their contractors'
employees, or even on those that closely control the labor relations of their
contractors." 61 The NLRB may recognize joint employer status, although
this is a difficult test to meet,62 but deny "inclusion of the joint employer's
workers in the existing bargaining unit because employer consent [is]
lacking. "6
Similarly, the NLRA does not ensure the right of independent
contractors to bargain collectively Indeed, organizing nonemployee
independent contractors is an unfair labor practice.' Umon organizing
efforts are unlawful unless directed toward the labor relations between an
employer and employees. However, the designation of the employer is not
dispositive. Rather, the common-law test applies to distinguish employees
from independent contractors.6' Legislative history of the enactment of
common-law standards under the NLRA explains:
"Employees" work for wages or salaries under direct supervision.
"Independent contractors" undertake to do a job for a price, decide how
the work will be done, usually hire others to do the work, and depend for
their income not upon wages, but upon the difference between what they
pay for goods, materials, and labor and what they receive for the end
result, that is upon profits.'
Potential adverse tax consequences also impede the organization of
independent contractors. Under section 501(c)(5) of the Code, "labor
organizations" generally are exempted from federal income taxes. IRS
61. Hiatt & Rhinehart, supra note 28, at 154; see also Gregory L. Hammond, Flexible
Staffing Trends and Legal Issues in the Emerging Workplace, 10 LAB. LAW 161, 173-75
(discussing Capitol EMI Music, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (May 28, 1993)).
62. It must be shown that the staffing firm and the host employer codetermme essential
terms and conditions of employment. Hiatt & Rhmehart, supra note 28, at 154 (citing NLRB
v Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir. 1982)).
63. Id. at 155 (citing Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 313 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (Nov 26,
1993); Flatbush Manor Care Ctr., 313 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (Nov 26, 1993); Greenhoot, Inc.,
205 N.L.R.B. 250 (1973)).
64. See Berzon, supra note 49, at 1 (citing Local No. 221 v NLRB, 899 F.2d 1238
(D.C. Cir. 1990)).
65. Id. at 8-9
66. H.R. REP No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947).
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 815 (1995)
interpretive rulings have indicated that the inclusion of a "small percentage"
of independent contractors in the membership does not affect a labor
organization's exempt status, implying that larger percentages would. 67 One
ruling in fact denied tax exempt status to a "labor organization," defined as
"an organization that primarily serves the interests of employees as
distinguished from serving the interests of either employers or self employed
persons. ,68
The organization at issue in the ruling included entrepreneurs and
employers, but the broad language of the ruling could extend to organiza-
tions that include independent contractors, who, although essentially wage
laborers, are classified as self-employed. Unions either should include
workers classified as independent contractors in a local in which they will
not constitute a majority or, if that is not feasible, be prepared to argue the
economic realities of the independent contractors as individuals who
exchange their labor for wages rather than as entrepreneurs or employers.69
Another legal question for unions is whether organizing independent
contractors will run afoul of the federal antitrust laws. The most important
provisions to consider are section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
"[e]very contract, combination ., or conspiracy" that unreasonably
restrains interstate or foreign commerce, 70 and the statutory exemption under
section 6 of the Clayton Act, which provides that "[t]he labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce." '7' The statutory
exemption does not apply when labor unions act in combination with
"nonlabor groups."'
The Supreme Court has held that independent contractors constitute a
"labor group" so long as there is "the presence of a job or wage competition
or some other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests
between the union members and the independent contractors."73 The Court
67 Robert J. Jones, Employees and Independent Contractors: The Tax Consequences
for Labor Unions, 13 LAB. L. EXCHANGE 15, 16 (1994) (citing Rev Rul. 77-154, 1977-1
C.B. 148; Rev Rul. 74-167, 1974-1 C.B. 134).
68. Id. at 17 (citing Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,035 (Mar. 7, 1977)).
69 Id. at 18.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1993) (as construed by Standard Oil Co. v United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
72. Peter J. Kadzik, Antitrust Concerns in Labor Union Organization of Independent
Contractors, 13 LAB. L. EXCHANGE 31, 33 (1994).
73. American Fed'n of Musicians v Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968); see Kadzik,
supra note 72, at 33-35.
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found such a presence of economic interrelationship between the umon
members and the "independent" workers when the union that sought to
organize the independent members of the occupations involved had already
organized employee members of the occupation. Thus, unions seeking to
organize workers who are classified as independent contractors should
determine whether there is a group of employees who perform similar work
and seek to organize the employees first if they are not already organized.74
A union that does not organize the employee members of the occupation
"should attempt to characterize the independent contractors as employees or
the equivalent of employees in a practical economic sense."7' The more that
"so-called independent contractors" look like employees selling only the
labor of a human being and less like "independent economic enterprises," the
stronger is the argument for treating them like employees.76
2. Practical Considerations
The practical obstacles to organizing and bargaining for contingent
workers may be more problematic than the legal ones. Employers are uring
sparingly and announcing layoffs. This situation has affected the bargaining
climate, making many employees reluctant to discuss their own wage and
benefit improvements at the bargaining table. With many people out of
work and looking for jobs, job security is a bargaining priority ' Also, the
job lock resulting from a worker's inability to replace employer-sponsored
health coverage (due to a pre-existmg condition or to the unavailability of
affordable coverage through alternative employment or in the individual
insurance market) has seriously mpaired worker mobility and underscored
the dependent status of full-time employees.
The escalating cost of health care also has undercut full-time workers'
ability to bargain effectively over wages. Health care issues have proved a
valuable organizing tool for umons, but increased levels of funding have
gone principally to retaining, not improving, benefits. Thus, bargaining to
extend fringe benefits to contingent workers may be met with strong
opposition not only from employers but from full-time workers as well. For
74. Kadzik, supra note 72, at 38.
75. Id. at 40.
76. Id. at 39.
77 See Ethel R. Nance, Bargaining '93, AFL-CIO REvIEWs THE IssuEs (AFL-CIO,
Washington, D.C.) No. 66, 1993, at 1, Robert J. Rabin, Book Review, 10 LAB. LAW 761,
762 (1994) (reviewing THE LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION (Matthew W
Finkin ed., 1994)).
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employers, any bargaining session over health benefit costs is not only
about adding to business costs but also about potentially lightening the load
of competitors. Health benefits have been at the center of labor-manage-
ment tensions for the past ten years and are the sticking point responsible
for more strikes than any other issue.7"
However, the issue of employer coverage of basic welfare benefits
comes down to whether employers will be required to internalize and
spread the costs of their labor supply or instead be allowed to continue
shifting to workers costs that employers properly should bear. As
explained by Senator Donald Riegle (D-Mich.) in the course of the health
reform debate, employees' good health creates an economic benefit over
time to the employer by ensuring that employees will be able to work.7 9
Because a major impetus behind contingent employment trends has been
avoidance of labor costs, bargaining for employers to bear the full labor
costs of the enterprise by extending benefits to contingent workers is mn the
interests of all union members so as not to be displaced by "cheap" labor.
With respect to including temporary hires in the bargaining unit,
unions need to manage two goals that at times might seem contradictory
One objective is to protect the temporary workers; the other is to prevent
the wholesale conversion of permanent full-time jobs into temporary work.
"The challenge is to protect the jobs and living standards of workers who
remain part of the permanent work force, while at the same time ensure
that contingent workers receive the stability and protection that they need
and deserve."80 Unions are accustomed to balancing interests under their
duty of fair representation,"1 and union involvement ensures that "workers'
interests are represented in how employment relationships are structured
within the firm."82
Contingent workers represent valuable organizing potential for unions
and constitute a vulnerable and exploited population, which is precisely the
78. See generally SEIU, OUT OF CONTROL, INTO DECLINE: THE DEVASTATING 12-
YEAR IMPACT OF HEALTHCARE COSTS ON WORKER WAGES, CORPORATE PROFITS AND
GOvERNMEBNTUDGETS (1992); AFL-CIO, DANGER AHEAD (1992); AFL-CIO, BARGAINING
FOR BENEFITS (1992).
79 Senators Push Shared Responsibility As Means To Achieve .Universal Coverage, 2
Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 492 (Mar. 14, 1994).
80. Hiatt & Rhmehart, supra note 28, at 147
81. A union has a duty to represent members of its bargaining unit in good faith,
without arbitrariness, hostility, or invidious discrimination. Vaca v Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Ford Motor Co. v Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
82. Carre, supra note 1, at 79
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constituency unions have existed to serve. "Historically, unions have
been a major force working to eliminate secondary labor markets and
improve job quality "83 As Professor Kalleberg points out, "Whe lower
pay, fewer benefits, lesser job security, and lack of advancement opportuni-
ties given to [contingent workers] may signal both the opportunity and need
for unions to increase their representation of tlus group." 4 Professor
Kalleberg's research shows that part-time workers are equally (if not more)
likely as full-timers to want union representation, 5 thus seeking empower-
ment through group association. The labor movement cannot afford to
overlook this source of "new recruits," 6 whose isolation may be relieved
by group commitment. Contingent employment conditions and the threat
of degradation these conditions pose for the entire work force are strong
evidence that American workers still need unions and that organized labor
has a role in the twenty-first century
B. Utilizing Technical Expertise
Union representation is most attractive and collective bargaining most
effective if employee representatives are well informed. In many cases the
laws applying to "the murky world" of contingent employment are "hazy,
definitions and regulations are easily stretched, and enforcement mecha-
nisms are often very weak."' Probably many employers have made a
"utility-maximizing decision to violate [employment laws] when the
probability of punishment is often very low "s Workers' rights under these
laws may not depend upon unions for their enforcement. "Help may come
in the person of a lawyer or a government agent rather than a shop steward
or business agent."8 9 However, there are not "enough judges and
courthouses to make common law litigation the modal institution of
employee grievance processing. "0 Employee representatives may make the
creation of exploitive contingent employment relationslups less attractive
by raising these issues in collective bargaining and, when necessary,
83. Tilly, supra note 16, at 40.
84. Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 791-92.
85. Id. at 791.
86. Id.
87 Belous, supra note 1, at 2.
88. Id.
89. Rabm, supra note 77, at 761.
90. Id. at 762 (quoting Professor Alan Hyde).
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"inducing courts and agencies to look more closely" at some of these
arrangements. 9
Examples of legal provisions that may be used as tools to extend
benefits to contingent workers are (1) Code section 410, which the IRS has
indicated restricts employers' ability to deny part-time employees partici-
pation in retirement plans;92 (2) ERISA section 510,93 which prohibits em-
ployers from interfering with a worker's attainment of employee benefit
rights; and (3) IRS worker classification rules that identify which workers
should be classified as employees for tax and ERISA purposes.94
1 Plan Participation Rules
Retirement plans that meet certain requirements under the Code are
qualified for favorable tax treatment. First, employer contributions to
"qualified plans" are not taxable to the employee until distributed (usually
years later, after retirement).95 Second, the employer is allowed an immed-
iate deduction. 96 Third, investment earnings on plan assets accumulate tax-
free in a tax-exempt trust.97 There is no blanket requirement that plans
cover all employees of the employer, and employers usually limit coverage
to reduce plan costs. However, plans may not .discriminate in favor of
"highly compensated employees,"" as defined in the Code. 99
Some Code rules set minimum standards for plan operation, such as
participation, vesting, and accrual rules, which are replicated under Title
I of ERISA.100 If a plan fails to satisfy the standards, the plan will lose its
qualified status, and highly compensated employees will be taxed on the
91. Berzon, supra note 49, at 13.
92. I.R.C. § 410(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
93. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(1988).
94. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885-2886
(extended indefinitely by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248,
§ 269(c), 96 Stat. 324, 552-553); Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (as amended 1980).
95. I.R.C. § 402 (Supp. V 1993).
96. Id. § 404 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
97 Id. § 501.
98. Id. § 401(m) (1988).
99. Id. § 414(q) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
100. EPLOYEEBENEFrrs LAW, supra note 5, at 74. "In general, the Code rules relating
to nondiscrimination with respect to coverage, nondiscrimination in contributions or benefits
and to limits on benefits and contributions are not found in Title I." Id.
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value of their vested plan benefits. In addition, compliance with a mini-
mum standard can be enforced through private litigation by a plan partic-
ipant or by the Department of Labor under Title I of ERISA. A proven
violation of an ERISA minimum standard results in the plan's being
required to comply with the rule both prospectively and retroactively 101
ERISA section 20202 and Code section 4103 establish rminmum stan-
dards for coverage and participation, including maximum age and service
requirements for participation and tests to determne whether the plan
covers a sufficiently broad group of employees. Although Code section
410(b) requires broad coverage, a plan may arbitrarily exclude a certain
percentage of employees under the "ratio test,"" and greater rates of
exclusion are allowed under the "average benefits test." The average
benefits test has two prongs: the "average benefits percentage" test"05 and
the "nondiscriminatory classification" test, under which the classification
of employees covered must be reasonable, reflect a bona fide business
classification of employees, and not discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees.,o 6
A number of plan sponsors exclude part-time employees from
participation on the theory that "full-time employees" is an acceptable
classification under section 410(b). According to the IRS, excluding part-
time employees may be permissible under section 410(b), but the exclusion
of part-time employees may violate section 410(a)." 7 Section 410(a)
prohibits a qualified plan from requiring as a condition of participation that
an employee complete more than one (in certain cases, two) year(s) of
service, defined as a 12-month period during which the employee has at
101. In some cases, the IRS also will allow retroactive amendment or correction. Id. at
74-75.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
103. I.R.C. § 410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
104. A plan meets the ratio test if it benefits a percentage of nonhighly compensated
employees which is at least 70 % of the percentage of highly compensated employees covered.
Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-2 (as amended in 1993).
105. A plan meets the "average benefits percentage test" if the "average benefits
percentage" of nonhighly compensated employees is at least 70% of the "average benefits
percentage" of highly compensated employees. Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-5 (as amended m
1993).
106. I.R.C. § 410(b)(2) (1988).
107 Tech. Adv Mem. 95-08-003 (Nov 10, 1994); see 1RS Issues Field Directive on
Employee Plan Exclusion of Part-Time Employees, [1994] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 224,
at G-1 (Nov 23, 1994).
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least 1,000 hours of service. Recent IRS guidance concludes that exclusion
of a class of part-time employees imposes an indirect service requirement on
plan participation. The requirement is impermissible if it could exceed one
year of service (or two years, where applicable). "A plan may not exclude
any part-time employee where it is possible for that employee to complete
one year of service (or two)."' "8 The IRS's interpretation of the section
410(a) participation rules, taken together with ERISA section 510's
prohibition of interference with attainment of employee benefits rights,
should be useful in representing part-time employees.
2. ERISA Section 510
An employer may exclude from plan participation any employee who
never completes one year of service, that is, an employee who works less
than 1,000 hours a year."° Employers often attempt to keep yearly total
hours below this threshold for employees supplied by staffing firms. It also
has become increasingly common for large corporations to establish an in-
house pool of contingent workers maintained to meet irregular and
fluctuating periods of labor demand. The Travelers Insurance Company, for
instance, reportedly "has a well-publicized on-call pool of retirees," whose
work hours are kept at or below 960 hours per year "to prevent them from
accruing additional pension credits that would increase their pension
income."
10
However, manipulating part-time work schedules to ensure that workers
log less than 1,000 hours a year may violate ERISA. Section 510 makes it
unlawful:
for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discrum-
nate, against a participant or beneficiary for the purpose of interfering
with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become
entitled under the plan, this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act. "'
Section 510 confers protection on a "participant" as defined under ERISA
section 3(7)."' The statutory definition of "participant" includes a person
who may become eligible for plan participation, and several courts have held
108. Id.
109. 29 U.S.C § 1052 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
110. Carr6, supra note 1, at 78-79 (citing 1986 9to5 study).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1140(1988).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988).
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that section 510 covers claims that an employer's conduct prevented an
employee from becoming a participant."I
Nearly every employment action affects benefit entitlements, and loss
of benefits as a "mere consequence" of an employment action will not
support a section 510 claim."4 However, it is unlawful for an employer to
take an adverse employment action if interference with employee benefit
rights is the "determinative '""' or "motivating" 116 factor. Seaman v Arvida
Realty Sales, "' a 1993 Eleventh Circuit case, explained that the standard
does not require a showing that "interference with ERISA rights was the sole
reason but does require plaintiff to show more than the incidental loss
of benefits. " "8
Hiring workers for positions specifically designed to prevent their ever
becoming entitled to benefits, if it could be proved," 9 might be sufficient.
Denying a worker's request to work additional hours to keep the worker
below 1,000 hours presents an even stronger case because refusal to extend
a worker's hours may be seen as an employment action more analogous to
termination, which has been the subject of cases like Seaman. Seaman held
that section 510 applies to claims of vested plaintiffs that they were
terminated and re-employed as independent contractors to prevent additional
113. See Report of the Subcommittee on Benefit Claims and Individual Rights,
in AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS COMMITTEE 1995 MID-WINTER MEETING PROGRAM PAPERS Tab 1, at 51
(1995) (citing Stephen Allen Lynn, P.C. Employee Profit Sharing Plan and Trust v
Stephen Allen Lynn, P.C., 25 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 1994); Vartanian v Monsanto Co., 14
F.3d 697 (1st Cir. 1994)); ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw, EMPLOY-
EE BENEFITS LAW 169-70 (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW SUPPLE-
MENT].
114. See Ronald Dean, Recent Section 510 Developments 6 (Jan. 27, 1995) (prepared
for ABA Section of Taxation 1995 Midyear Meeting in Los Angeles, Cal.) (citing Meredith
v Navistar Int'l Transp., 935 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1991); Gavalik v Continental Can, 812
F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987)).
115. Id. at7
116. Id. (citing Clark v Coats & Clark, 990 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1993); Dytrt v
Mountain State, 921 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1990); Dister v Continental Group, 859 F.2d 1108
(2d Cir. 1988)).
117 985 F.2d 543 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114S. Ct. 308 (1993).
118. Seaman v Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 308 (1993).
119 Nominally, the Title VII shifting burdens of proof and production apply See Dean,
supra note 114, at 7; EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw SUPPLEMENT, supra note 113, at 169-70;
Report of the Subcommittee on Benefit Claims and Individual Rights, supra note 113, at 53-
54 (citing DeVoll v Burdick Painting, Inc., 35 F.3d 408 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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benefit accruals."2 The court found that the action, taken to eliminate
pension and health plan costs, violated section 510. This reasoning may be
extended to find that employment practices like the Travelers Insurance
Company 'S21 constitute unlawful interference with the attainment of em-
ployee benefit rights if the employer refuses to allow an employee to work
additional hours so as to prevent additional pension accruals.
Further, Seaman raises the question whether the decision to outsource
or to hire workers with independent contractor status can constitute
discrimination prohibited under section 510 if the action would not have
been taken "but for" the savings on benefits. Alternatively, workers might
challenge their classification as independent contractors and claim coverage
under the terms of an employer's fringe benefit plans.
3. Worker Classification Rules
Many employers, either. intentionally or unintentionally, misclassify
their workers as independent contractors rather than as employees" for tax
advantages, to avoid responsibility for providing them fringe benefits, and
perhaps also to construct barriers to union organizing. For tax purposes,
businesses report payments to, but do not withhold employment taxes from,
independent contractors. This relieves the employer of liability for the
employer's share of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)'3 and
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)124 taxes. FICA payments are for
Social Security benefits and Medicare."z Misclassifymg employees allows
employers to "cut their labor costs by as much as 25[%].""6 These costs are
shifted to the independent contractor, who is liable not only for payment of
estimated taxes because income tax is not being withheld but also for all
120. See 1994 Report of the Subcommittee on Civil Procedure, in AMERICAN BAR ASS'N
SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW EMPLOYEE BENEFITs COMMITTEE Tab 11, at 5
(1995) (citing Seaman v Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 545 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 308 (1993)).
121. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing practices of Travelers).
122. See Taxleads: Section 1099 Compliance Crackdown, [1995] Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 5, at H-1 (Jan. 9, 1995) (citing PrO Unlimited consulting firm figures that IRS
has reclassified more than 400,000 workers since 1987 and that one out of seven companies
is incorrectly treating part of its employee population as independent contractors).
123. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
124. Id. §§ 3301-3311.
125. Berzon, supra note 49, at 12.
126. No Consensus at Small Business Heanng on Worker Status Issue, [1995] Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at G-4 (Jan. 20, 1995) (quoting Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Cal.)).
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Social Security and Medicare payments under the Self Employment
Contributions Act (SECA).27 Additionally, these workers are left entirely
unprotected by unemployment compensation. Misclassification can have a
"devastating effect on the unsuspecting worker," who may be unaware of the
tax obligations.
Employers also save on retirement and health benefits by creating the
appearance of independent contractor status. Independent contractors need
not be counted in calculating whether plans comply with the statutory
coverage requirements, which apply to employees." Further, employers
generally are not required under the terms of their plans to provide pensions
and benefits to independent contractors. "29 Plan contributions generally are
made only on behalf of "employees.""3
Simply designating a worker as an independent contractor is not enough
to avoid benefit costs legally For both employment tax and ERISA
purposes, employment status is determined under the "usual common law
rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship,t
13'
subject to various exceptions for employment tax purposes, notably the "safe
harbor" provisions of section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978.1 Treasury
regulations explain that a worker is an employee if the "person for whom
services are performed has the right to control and direct" the worker "not
only as to the result to be accomplished but also as to the details and means
by which that result is accomplished." 3 Actual control is not necessary as
long as the nght to control is present.'3 Under the IRS test, twenty factors
are to be considered m determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether
sufficient control and direction exist to establish an employer-employee
relationship. 35 The more factors that are present, the more likely it is that
127 I.R.C. §§ 1401-1403 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
128. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text. However, contract employees who
qualify as "leased employees" deemed to have performed services at any organization on a
substantially full-time basis are required to be taken into account under I.R.C. § 414(n). See
generally Hammond, supra note 61.
129. See Jones, supra note 67, at 19.
130. See rd.
131. See I.R.C. § 3121(d)(2) (1988); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v- Darden, 112 S. Ct.
1344, 1348 (1992).
132. "Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885-2886
(extended indefinitely by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248,
§ 269(c), 96 Stat. 324, 552-553).
133. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1980).
134. Id.
135. See Rev Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
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an employer-employee relationship exists. However, no one factor is dis-
positive.
Because the common-law test is somewhat unpredictable and subjective,
section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 originally was enacted as a
temporary measure to relieve employers from the threat of potentially
ruinous assessment of taxes, interest, and penalties. However, it has had the
effect of allowing employers to misclassify workers indefinitely without
liability for employment taxes if:
1. the employer did not treat the worker as an employee during
any period;
2. the employer has filed applicable information returns, i.e.,
Form 1099, on a basis consistent with independent contractor
status;
3. the employer classified the worker in the same way it classified
all other workers holding substantially smilar positions; and
4. the employer has a reasonable basis for the classification.36
Three "safe harbors" satisfy the "reasonable basis" requirement if reasonably
relied upon by the employer:
1. treatment of the worker as an independent contractor is sanc-
tioned by judicial precedent or IRS ruling;
2. the employer was subject to a prior IRS audit which did not
result m an assessment attributable to the employer's classifica-
tion of workers as independent contractors, and the positions of
current workers are substantially similar to those held by
workers in the years audited; or
3. treatment of the worker as an independent contractor is consis-
tent with longstanding, recognized practice of a significant
segment of the industry m which the worker is engaged.1
3 7
To protect taxpayers' reasonable expectations, section 530 also prohibited
the IRS from issuing clarifying regulations or rulings on the proper
classification of workers.' Therefore, subjectivity and unpredictability
have persisted.
Section 530 has resulted in considerable, unrectified misclassification,
particularly under the second safe harbor, which allows continued nusclassi-
136. Revenue Act of 1978, § 530(a)(1) & (3).
137 Id. § 530(a)(2).
138. Id. § 530(b).
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fication even if the issue was not raised, or even considered, m a prior audit
and regardless of when the audit occurred. As one writer observes, "Critics
charge that the prior audit safe harbor produces arbitrary results, since two
employers in exactly the same circumstances may receive diametrically
opposite treatment on their employment taxes, based solely on the happen-
stance that one of them was audited m the past, even if the worker classifica-
tion issue was never considered by the IRS at that time."3 9
Nevertheless, many employers do not qualify for section 530 relief, and
an employer that nusclassifies workers may thus still be liable for back
taxes, interest, and substantial penalties."4 Employers may not consider the
risk of detection to be great given the low IRS audit coverage, and econonuc
incentives thus too often have been seen to outweigh the risks. However,
unions and individual workers can act as deterrents and agents of admnistra-
tive enforcement.
For example, the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades
Department is looking for test cases to file under state worker misclassifi-
cation laws, although no suits had been filed by unions as of August 1994. 141
The Building and Construction Trades Department also is participating in the
IRS "market segmentation" program, which concentrates resources along
industry lines so that IRS personnel can develop expertise mn particular
industries and develop with them "market segment agreements" defining
appropriate classification guidelines. "The IRS views the market segment
agreements primarily as a means to increase voluntary compliance by
reducing complexity "142 Although nonbinding, the agreements may be
useful in deterring abuses, for example, by identifying the "industry
practice" and thus reducing opportunities for employers to abuse the section
530 safe harbor.
Those employers who are playing the "audit lottery"'43 depend upon the
IRS's lack of awareness of their activities. The realization that knowledge-
able bargaining representatives are monitoring employment activity may
systematically curb misclassification. Additionally, workers misclassified
as independent contractors can sue for coverage under an employer's benefit
plans. For example, in a case argued by Uiversity of Alabama Law School
Professor Norman Stem at the request of the Washington, D C. based
139. Jones, supra note 67, at 23.
140. See I.R.C. §§ 3509, 6651, 6656, 6721. 6722 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
141. Jones, supra.note 67, at 25.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 18.
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Pension Rights Center, a laid-off Honeywell employee was rehired within
a few months as a "consultant" for a year and a half." The Eleventh Circuit
upheld the worker's claim for "employee" benefits under the terms of the
plans for the period during which she performed services as a consultant
because she proved she was an employee under the common-law test. For
this purpose, of course, the section 530 safe harbors do not apply
If an employer has misclassified a substantial number of workers, upon
reclassification the employer's retirement plan may be found to discrim-
inate in favor of highly compensated employees and lose its valuable tax
qualification. 45 Unfortunately, because of the facts-and-circumstances
nature of the inquiry, suits challenging worker classification for ERISA
purposes are not likely to qualify as class actions.146 However, instances of
misclassification can be brought to the attention of the Department of Labor
for more systematic resolution. "[U]mons may have a part to play, for
example, m guiding employees to the appropriate administrative agency ,147
C. Damage-Control Lobbying
Although a certain amount of contingent employment "regulation" can
be accomplished through collective bargaining and pursuing rights under
current law, current law is defective in many respects, in addition to erecting
legal obstacles to union organization. The employment-based social welfare
system under ERISA provides inadequate health coverage and retirement
income security for even full-time workers. Nevertheless, there is little
chance that the 104th Congress will produce much better law "Management
is generally content with the status quo "'4 However, at least two
subjects of proposed legislation may be worth raising here. First, there is
a fair chance that advocates for workers could influence the choice among
alternative proposals for legislation that clarifies e worker classification
rules. Second, some incremental health reform may be attempted, including
taxation of health benefits, 49 which workers-rights advocates should oppose.
144. Daughtrey v Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488 (1lth Cir. 1993).
145. I.R.C. § 410(b) (1988).
146. See, e.g., Fietsam v Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 93-C916, 1994 WL
323313 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1994) (denying class certification because individual questions
predominated).
147 Rabin, supra note 77, at 761.
148. Samuel Estreicher, Win-Win Labor Law Reform, 10 LAB. LAW 667, 667 (1994).
149. See, e.g., Kerrey, Danforth Propose Payroll Tax Cut, Cap on Break for Employer-
Paid Insurance, [1994] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 235, at G-3, G-4 (Dec. 12, 1994)
(reporting proposal of Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform that would cap
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As to the latter, many progressive reformers have accepted as mtellec-
tually unassailable that the federal tax treatment of health benefits is a tax
"subsidy" and have therefore been receptive to taxing benefits. 15 The
abstract theoretical proposition that nontaxation of health benefits is a sub-
sidy has been advanced with an entirely inappropriate degree of certainty 151
Therefore, I conclude this discussion by challenging the premise that
employment-derived health benefits are "subsidized"'" and by explaining
why tax equity for workers requires nontaxation.
1. Worker Classification Reform
Congressional interest in deficit reduction may find expression through
tightening the definition of "employee" for tax purposes even though the
deduction for employer-paid health insurance or include in employees' income amounts m
excess of average premium). See generally Joseph M. Dodge, A Democratic Tax Manifesto,
66 TAX NOTES 1313, 1326 (1995) (proposing taxation of fringe benefits); B.J. Hickert,
Health Care: A Simple Prescription, 66 TAX NOTES 1193 (1995) (proposing tax cap).
150. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 1, at 1505-09; Jonathan B. Forman, Synchronizing
Social Welfare Programs and Tax Provisions, 59 TAx NOTES 417, 423 (1993). But see
duRivage, supra note 13, at 98 (recommending liberalizing deduction of health care costs,
although only for expenses m excess of 3 % of adjusted gross income).
151. For example, Professor O'Connell has imported from the tax literature the
conclusion that nontaxation of employment-derived health benefits is "special treatment" that
is the equivalent of a government "subsidy" in the form of tax relief, otherwise known as a
"tax expenditure." O'Connell, supra note 1, at 1505-09 The dictionary defines a "subsidy"
as financial assistance granted by the government to an individual or business. THE
SCIENER-BANTAM ENGLISH DICTIONARY 908 (1979). A "tax subsidy" occurs when people
are excused from paying what they ought to pay m taxes. The assertion that nontaxation of
health benefits is a "subsidy" is a relatively minor point m Professor O'Connell's excellent
argument that employment-derived health benefits are not entirely "earned," a point on which
we agree. However, the term "subsidy" is loaded, incorporating presuppositions that
elsewhere she indicates she does not in fact accept. Arthur Goldberg relied on observations
similar to Professor O'Connell's in explaining why health benefits should not be taxed:
We regard the provision of minimum insurance coverage for employees and their
dependents as a responsibility of the employer of precisely the same character as
the responsibility to provide safe working conditions, adequate lighting, reasonable
safety devices, etc. The provision of this insurance coverage is not compensation
and the benefits are not provided on a compensation basis but on a service basis
irrespective of the cost as to any particular employee.
STANLEY S. SURREY ET AL., 1 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
139 (1972) (identifying Arthur Goldberg as General Counsel for Congress of Industrial
Relations).
152. For a more extensive analysis, see Gwen T. Handelman, The Truth About Tax
Subsidies for Health Benefits, 61 TAX NOTES 353 (1993).
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current Congress is likely unwilling to liberalize the defintion under the
NLRA or other employee protective statutes. Billions of dollars m income
and payroll taxes are lost annually due to rmsclassification. 53 Numerous
reform proposals, some offered by Republicans and traditionally Republican
constituencies, are circulating."5 The proposals tend to be designed either
primarily to reclassify independent contractors as employees, which would
afford maximum protection to workers, or to facilitate independent
contractor compliance with tax laws. The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants' (AICPA) proposal is of the latter variety Nevertheless,
the AICPA proposal would benefit workers by denying employers some of
the incentive to classify workers as independent contractors when inconsis-
tent with the econormc realities of the employment relationship.
The AICPA's Small Business Taxation Committee has proposed a
"mechanical" four-prong "safe harbor" providing that an individual would
be treated as an independent contractor for tax purposes if all of the
following requirements were met:
1. prior to performing services, the individual and the business
executed a written agreement including:
i. a description of services;
153. See Tax Gap Among Service Providers Between $21 and $30 Billion, Says GAO,
[1994] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 247, at G-6 (Dec. 29, 1994) (citing GAO report estimating
that 9.2 million sole proprietors who provide services to customers and do not sell any goods
as part of their businesses owe at least $21 billion dollars m taxes on unreported earnings);
duRivage, supra note 13, at 106 (reporting 1989 GAO estimates that 38% of employers
misclassify employees, thus avoiding payroll taxes).
154. See, e.g., Advisory Panel Suggests Hike in FUTA Wage Base, End of 0.2 Percent
Surcharge, [1995] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at G-3 (Jan. 5, 1995) (reporting
recommendation of Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation that "safe harbor"
and restriction on IRS's authority to address ambiguity under classification guidelines be
eliminated); No Consensus at Small Business Heanng on Worker Status Issue, [1995] Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at G-4 (Jan. 20, 1995) (discussing hearing on H.R. 510,
cosponsored by Reps. Shays (R-Conn.) and Lantos (D-Cal.), which would repeal "safe
harbor" and restriction on IRS's authority to draft clarifying regulations, require prime
contractors to notify legitimate independent contractors of their tax obligations and other
statutory rights and protections, and provide amnesty for one year); Taxleads: Independent
Contractors, [1995] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at H-1 (Feb. 13, 1995) (reporting on
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Small Business Taxation Committee's
proposed "mechanical" four-part test, which would be unavailable if worker had ever
performed similar services for business, and requirement that businesses remit to IRS 20%
of payments to independent contractors); Taxleads: New Standard for Independent
Contractors, [1995] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at H-1 (Feb. 21, 1995) (reporting that
H.R. 582, introduced by Rep. Kim (R-Cal.), would create "clear, objective test" and allow
IRS reclassification if prior audit had not included examination of employment status).
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ii. remuneration to be paid;
iii. a provision assuring that the individual would be responsi-
ble for federal and state income taxes and Social Security
taxes;
iv a stipulation that the business would not provide fringe
benefits to the individual;
v acknowledgement that the individual complied with applic-
able business licensing requirements;
vi. acknowledgement that the individual maintained a proper
set of books and records; and
vii. acknowledgement that the individual did not have an
exclusive agreement for services with the signatory
business.
2. the business withheld and remitted monthly to the IRS 20% of
all payments to the individual (which would be allowed as a
credit for withholding on the individual's tax return);
3. the individual had never performed similar services as an em-
ployee for the -busmess signmng the agreement; and
4. the business reported the individual's mcome and withholding
on the appropriate Forms 1099 to the IRS and the individual. 55
The AICPA proposal properly redirects the focus away from physical
control, which is the hallmark of the common-law test but is irrelevant to the
determination of economic dependence and is the source of considerable
ambiguity
The fewer the differences that turn on worker classification, the less
incentive an employer would have to misclassify workers. The AICPA
proposal would help by requiring income tax withholding on independent
contractors. However, a better test would focus more on the worker's
economic and entrepreneurial independence and on whether "the economic
resources exist to provide insurance and other forms of economic security
independently " Factors should relate to the "opportunity for profit and
loss; investment in equipment or materials; employment of or partnership or
other economic association with others; the degree of continuity of the
relationship; and whether the service rendered is an integral part of the
employer's business. "l"
155. AICPA Committee Proposes Independent Contractor Safe Harbor, [1995] Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at G-9 (Jan. 27, 1995).
156. Berzon, supra note 49, at 13.
157 Id. at 12.
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Representative Jim Kay (R-Cal.) has proposed a test that approximates
an economic independence test, but it principally is an add-on to the current
safe harbors. Representative Kay's test anus to shift the IRS focus from
reclassifying independent contractors to enforcing independent contractor
compliance. Under this measure, service providers would meet the
independent contractor definition if they provide services pursuant to a
written agreement stating the specific services to be provided and the
duration of and remuneration for the services. 151 In addition, service
providers must satisfy any one of the following criteria:
1. the service provider can suffer a loss or make a profit from the
services provided;
2. the service provider has a principal place of business other than
the business for which services are performed and has signifi-
cant investment in tools or facilities;
3. the service provider makes services available to the general
public and has provided those services as an independent
contractor to at least one other recipient during the current year
or the previous year; or
4. the service provider is paid exclusively on commission and
either (i) has a principal place of business other than the
premises of the recipient business, or (ii) pays fair market value
for rent or lease of business space from the business. 159
The bill would repeal the current safe harbor that permits employers to
continue misclassifying workers solely because the business was previously
audited. It would allow the IRS to reclassify independent contractors
prospectively as employees if the business qualified for a safe harbor based
on a prior audit that did not include an examination of employment status.
An alternative to these proposals would be for Congress to borrow the
concept of "dependent" contractors from Canadian law '60 Such workers
deserve the same protections as common-law employees for purposes such
as Social Security and unemployment benefits because they are not in fact
entrepreneurs with substantial financial resources at stake or profit
potential. 161 Using the "dependent" contractor concept, businesses might be
158. Bill Seeks to Establish Standardfor Defining Independent Contractors, 13 Employee
Rel. Wkly (BNA) No. 7, at 176 (Feb. 20, 1995).
159 Id.
160. Berzon, supra note 49, at 12 (citing Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. ch. 228,
§ l(1)(h) (1980) (as amended)).
161. Id. at 2.
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required to withhold income taxes, transmit them to the government, and pay
FICA and FUTA taxes, perhaps based on the proportion of the time spent
working for a particular employer and the hourly or monthly rate of
compensation. The justification would be that it is fair to cast the adminis-
trative and partial economic burden of tax compliance for such individuals
upon the enterprise that derives the major benefit of and profit from their
labor.
Although employers who claim a deduction for the services are well
positioned to assume responsibility for income tax withholding and a pro rata
share of employment taxes, it is politically improbable that "dependent"
contractor status will be recognized if payment of FICA and FUTA taxes is
required. Still, the AICPA proposal, and perhaps others, would likely be
more beneficial to workers than current law and thus a more effective tool
for advocates of worker interests. The best test having any realistic chance
of passage is likely one that clarifies the distinctions based on economic
realities and that imposes an income tax withholding requirement.
2. Taxing Benefits
As entrepreneurial risks, although not entrepreneurial profits, are being
shifted to workers under the new employment and political order, tax reform
should, but likely will not, equalize the tax treatment of entrepreneurs and
wage earners. As Professor O'Connell has observed, "Risks that were once
collective are becoming individual," particularly health protections for
workers.162 For contingent workers, "unfair tax policies exacerbate their
economic situation."" The cost of health insurance and medically necessary
care should be fully deductible from taxed income for all workers.
Adequate medical attention to maintain one's fitness for employment ought
to be recognized as a cost that offsets earnings from labor equally as
maintenance expenses on a manufacturer's capital equipment or the utility
bills of a shopkeeper offset their business income.
Business and investment outlays are entitled to deduction because not
doing so would result in "double taxation" of amounts taxed as income when
originally received.' 61 For example, if $100 is taxed at a 15% rate, $85
remains. If the taxpayer buys materials for $85 to produce a product that
sells for $90, the taxpayer has a taxable gain of only $5 ($90 in receipts
minus $85 in expenditures made to generate receipts). The taxpayer should
162. O'Connell, supra note 1, at 1525.
163. duRivage, supra note 13, at 91.
164. Dodge, supra note 149, at 1314-15.
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not have to pay tax again on the $85. Income tax should be imposed only
on increases in wealth.
Any expenditure to secure health insurance represents a loss of
wealth - an immediate loss to avert a later potentially catastrophic loss.
Also, any expenditure for medically necessary care is a decrease m wealth
and so should be deducted in assessing taxes. Correspondingly, workers
should continue to pay no income or employment taxes on the value of
health coverage provided through employment 65 because not including an
amount in the first place yields the same result as taking a deduction from
income subject to tax. Health care costs need not be "extraordinary" for
deduction or exclusion from income to be justified. Accordingly, no
"floor" is appropriate. Nor should this tax treatment be regarded as a
"subsidy," with the implication that deduction (or exclusion, which
produces the same result) is somehow a government giveaway
It is beside the point to note that exclusions and deductions from
taxable income save more tax dollars for those with higher incomes who
are taxed at higher tax rates. This observation of the effect of progressive
tax rates is irrelevant unless the amount being excluded or deducted from
taxable income actually represents increases in the taxpayer's economic
power and thus properly should be taxed. "Economic power" is a
shorthand term for the measure of ability to pay taxes, which is the extent
of people's actual discretionary control over the resources around them.
Some types of expenditures labeled "medical" may in fact be for personal
consumption, such as examination or treatment at luxury resorts, but the
expenses of medically necessary care are not exercises of economic power.
Adherence to an academic defimtion of "economic power" that includes
health benefits wrongly ignores both control as an issue in determimng
whether an increase has been experienced and human capital losses in
determining whether a decrease has occurred.' 66
A proper determination of whether nontaxation of health benefits is a
subsidy must consider the practical experiences and perspectives of wage
earners. As a practical matter, health benefits do not improve one's
financial capacity to pay taxes. Although health benefits "provide access
to money or services, they are intended not to augment wealth, but to
insulate the recipient from economic calamity "167 Indeed, the money or
165. I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
166. See generally Mary L. Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88
MICH. L. REv 722 (1990).
167 O'Connell, supra note 1, at 1423.
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services may be "accessed" only in the rather narrow circumstance of
seeking treatment for a medical condition, "precipitated by circumstances
rather than free choice, against the taxpayer's will or at least in spite
of the taxpayer's wishes." 68 Utilizing coverage to prevent rather than treat
illnesses or accidental injuries is no greater an exercise of domimon and
control. Instead, it is an action taken under the duress of threat-of harm
from disease.
Thus, neither the availability nor the utilization of health coverage
increases economic power. Obtaining coverage through employment is not
a gain transaction but merely serves to preserve the status quo, as do
expenditures to restore health. Because there is no increase in economic
power, there should be no tax on coverage. Likewise, the cost of health
insurance and medically necessary care should be fully deductible from
gross income for workers not covered through employment. Currently,
they may deduct only costs of medical care that exceed 7.5 % of income,
although Congress has retroactively reinstated the 25 % deduction for health
insurance costs of independent contractors and others who are "self-
employed" and increased the deduction to 30% for tax years after 1994.169
168. Gwen T. Handelman, Employer-Provided Health Benefits Not an Asset to Be Taxed,
HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 11, 1993, Outlook section at 4, repnnted in ROANOKE TIMES &
WORLD-NEWS, April 13, 1993, at A5 (titled Don't Tax Health-Care Benefits).
169. See generally H.R. REP No. 12, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (reporting
Conference agreement on H.R. 831). The House of Representatives passed the measure in
February, rejecting a Democratic amendment that would have extended the 25% deduction
to employees not covered by employer-provided health insurance. House Passes Permanent
Extension of Health Deduction for Self-Employeds, [1995] Tax Bull. (RIA) No. 8, at 1 (Feb.
23, 1995). A Joint Committee on Taxation report explained the state of the law before
reinstatement:
Under present law, the tax treatment of health insurance expenses depends on
whether the taxpayer is an employee and whether the taxpayer is covered under
a health plan paid for by the employee's employer. An employer's contribution
to a plan providing accident or health coverage for the employee and the
employee's spouse and dependents is excludable from an employee's income. The
exclusion is generally available in the case of owners of a business who are also
employees.
In the case of self-employed individuals (i.e., sole proprietors or partners in
a partnership [or independent contractors]) no equivalent exclusion applies.
However, prior law provided a deduction for 25[%] of the amount paid for health
insurance for a self-employed individual and the individual's spouse and
dependents.
Other individuals who purchase their own health insurance (e.g., someone
whose employer does not provide health insurance) can deduct their insurance
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For workers who receive no health coverage through employment or
who face co-insurance and co-payment costs, a full deduction would
reduce health care costs by their tax rate (likely 15 or 28% at the federal
level).
170
Wage labor is disadvantaged under the existing income tax system.
Professor Kalleberg has shown that a majority of both full-time and part-
time workers regard work as their primary life activity 171 Thus, the
primary purpose of an individual's investments in human capital is what tax
practitioners would call a "business purpose." Generally, expenses
motivated primarily by a business purpose may be deducted from taxed
income because such expenditures are necessary costs of producing income
analogous to the cost of materials to make a product, which should not be
subject to double taxation. For example, if the primary purpose of travel
is business, tax law allows deductions for the cost of the trip.172
Further, employers may deduct their costs of recruiting, traimng, and
retaining a work force and can deduct through depreciation their investment
in a "workforce in place." 173 Disallowing deductions for similarimvest-
ments in oneself disadvantages workers' investment in their human capital
relative to financial capital investments and disadvantages workers relative
to employers. Under current law, employers need not make human capital
investments in their work force, but are considered entitled to a deduction
for this cost of generating profits if they do. 174 Meanwhile, workers, who
have no choice but to invest a certain amount in their well-being to function
as workers, are either demed the deduction 175 or allowed an exclusion and
told that it is government largesse.
Elimination of the medical expense deduction "floor" is probably not
on the horizon, but resisting taxation of benefits is essential. A tax on
premiums only to the extent that the premiums, when combined with other
unreimbursed medical expenses, exceed 7.5[%] of adjusted gross income.
Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Description (JCX-6-95) of H.R. 831, To Extend Deduction
for Self-Employed Individuals' Health Insurance Costs, repnnted in [1995] Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 27, at L-1 (Feb. 9, 1995).
170. I.R.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
171. Kalleberg, supra note 8, at 777
172. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (1988).
173. Id. § 197 (Supp. V 1993). For a discussion of the law prior to the enactment of
Code § 197, see Ithaca Industries, Inc. v Commissioner, 17 F.3d 684 (4th Cir.), cert.
dented, 115 S. Ct. 83 (1994).
174. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988).
175. Id. § 262.
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benefits would further discourage employers from providing benefits and
profoundly affect collective bargaining. Econonusts agree that employees
will end up paying whether the tax is imposed on employees or
employers. 176 Maintaining current benefit levels would be made prohibi-
tively expensive by adding to the cost of employer-paid health care. It is
unjustly punitive to increase the cost of medically necessary care. Wasteful
or extravagant medical care expenditures (such as spa treatments, lavishly
appointed health facilities, or elective cosmetic surgery), which represent
simply personal indulgence m the guise of medical care, ought to be
recognized as taxable under current law
Policy analysts should appreciate the difference between eliminating
a subsidy and imposing a penalty on those who are currently covered by
employment-derived insurance for medically necessary care. Such taxation
would largely serve as punishment for the sin of effective collective
bargaining.
IV Conclusion
Professor Kalleberg and others have shown that much contingent
employment is coercive and mequitable and that it is contributing to the
degradation of the American work force and to the deterioration of our
employment-based social welfare system. Most contingent workers accept
inadequate compensation and typically no health insurance or retirement
benefits because they have no choice. "Voluntary" contingent employment
also is problematic to the extent that contingent workers forego "fringe
benefits" from their own employment and depend on benefits received
through their spouses' employment. This raises the labor costs of the
spouses' employers, increasing the employers' economic incentive to shift
work to contingent employees who will not be covered.
Businesses that provide health coverage subsidize the labor costs of
those that do not by covering spouses and dependents who work at firms
that fail to provide medical coverage and by paying medical bills that
include a surcharge for the cost of providing uncompensated care to the
uninsured employees of those firms. Thus, businesses that currently
provide coverage are under competitive pressure to cut back health benefits
and to sift that portion of the employer's labor costs to workers who are
in no position to protect their own economic security These are costs that
properly should be internalized by the enterprise and borne by investors,
176. See generally SEIU, supra note 78.
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but instead are forced on workers without any corresponding right to
business profits.
For the present, the best chance of extending health and retirement
benefits to contingent workers is through collective bargaimng and
collective and individual litigation, rather than through legislation. New
employment rights can be created by contract through collective bargain-
ing, and rights under current law can be enforced. Vindication of
employment rights through private suit is costly and disruptive and may be
unnecessary Both employers and employees will benefit from organizing
the contingent work force so that workplace issues can be resolved on a
systematic basis through contract negotiation and grievance procedures.
Progressive academics need to find ways to channel expertise into the
organizing and bargaimng processes, and into litigation when necessary
We must also collaborate with federal and state regulators to assist
admnistrative enforcement of worker-protective laws. In all these efforts,
however, the realities of life for working people must instruct theoretical
insight. If we are indeed on the side of workers, we must listen and
respond to workers' experiences to produce meaningful and effective
reform.
